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INTRODUCTION 
Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of criminal pro-
ceedings. They are not expected to possess-and very often do not possess-
expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them to provide 
expert advice on matters that lie outside their area of training and experience.1 
Justice Alito expresses an accurate assessment of criminal defense; 
one that is often unknown in the quiet halls of academia or among the whis-
* Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. J.D. 1988 Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, B.A. Philosophy and History 1985 University of Virginia. The author 
would like to thank John Blume, Brad Shannon, Sean McCall, Jason Murray, Brandy E. 
Natalzia, Christopher Roederer, and Lydia Sturgis. 
I. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487-88 (2010) (Aiito, J., concurring). As 
this Article points out, defense attorneys are now often required to provide expert advice on 
matters of psychiatry and immigration law. 
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pers in pristine appellate courtrooms. The vast majority of criminal defense 
attorneys defend what is known as "street crime," and they do so in chaotic 
hallways, cramped courtrooms, and filthy jails. Defense counsel negotiate in 
courtroom stairwells, across cafeteria tables, in holding cells, and in hall-
ways. Their knowledge of evidence, constitutional law, criminal law, and 
procedure must be closer than their fingertips, since time and patience are 
the luxurious exception, while listening, analyzing, and objecting sirnulta-
neously2 are the required norm. Catching a glimpse of this messy reality 
from his lofty viewpoint, Justice Alita makes a simple yet important point: 
criminal defense attorneys are trained to defend accused criminals.3 In fact, 
they are trained to resolve the criminal charge, but they are not trained and 
should not be held responsible for resolving every problem that arises in a 
defendant's life. However, recent Supreme Court decisions place heavy 
burdens on criminal defense attorneys who defend the poor. 
While a successful appeal may reverse an unfair conviction and estab-
lish important precedents that benefit future defendants, the rights of any 
individual criminal defendant are most effectively protected at the trial lev-
el, with a verdict of not guilty or an acceptable plea bargain. Thus, each case 
tried by every defense attorney is defended on two levels: making the case 
(for the jury) while making the record (for appeal).4 As the Supreme Court 
has long recognized, the most effective way to produce a fair trial is to en-
sure that an accused has access to a competent, zealous defense attorney.5 
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wain-
wright, requiring that criminal defendants who could not afford to retain an 
attorney would be provided one by the state.6 Gideon remains the symbolic 
foundation of indigent defense. Prior to Gideon, criminal defendants who 
could not afford to hire an attorney had no federal constitutional right to 
appointed counsel, and could possibly have risked prosecution, and even 
execution, without legal assistance.7 After Gideon, every criminal defendant 
charged with a felony is defended by an attorney, even those who cannot 
2. See FED. R. Evm. 103(a) ("A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or ex-
clude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and: ( 1) if the ruling 
admits evidence, a party, on the record: (A) timely objects or moves to strike; and (B) states 
the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context."). 
3. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487. 
4. With gratitude to Professor William Geimer. "Defending a Capital Case in Vir-
ginia IX: Making the Case While Making the Record," Washington & Lee University School 
of Law Lexington, Virginia (Apr. II, 1997). 
5. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
6. 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963). 
7. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-50, 58, 73 (1932) (holding that 
"defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense" and subsequent-
ly reversing the convictions of several African-American men who were tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to death for the rape of two white girls by juries in three separate trials completed 
in one day). 
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afford to hire one.8 In fact, because indigent defendants constitute the major-
ity of all suspects arrested,9 the government typically finances both attor-
neys in a modern criminal case: the prosecutor and the defense attorney. 
Representing criminal defendants presents wide-ranging challenges. 
Defending various crimes encompasses diverse areas of skill and expertise: 
even a simple driving while intoxicated charge necessitates that the defense 
attorney be cognizant of recent, complicated constitutional law cases, 10 un-
derstand the mechanics of laboratory machinery, 11 and be able to effectively 
8. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) 
(holding state must provide indigent defendant access to competent psychiatrist for trial 
purposes when sanity at time of offense is at issue). 
9. "Publicly financed counsel represented about 66% of federal felony defendants 
in 1998 as well as 82% of felony defendants in the 75 most populous counties in 1996." 
Indigent Defense Systems, BUREAU OF JusT. STAT. http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfin?ty=tp& 
tid=28 (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
10. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307-11 (2009) (holding that 
the Confrontation Clause requires that the analyst who performed narcotics analysis testify 
and be subject to cross-examination); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709-10, 
2716 (20 11) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not allow the introduction of foren-
sic evidence through a testimonial, signed certificate of analysis in a DWI case and that 
instead the analyst must appear and be subject to cross-examination, or be somehow unavail-
able). 
11. For example, defense attorneys should be aware of blood analysis methods for 
drug tests: 
The preferred method of blood analysis (when looking for alcohol content) is 
a process called "gas chromatography" or "GC." This testing method utilizes a 
measuring technique of comparison of a known "standard" to the subject's sample. 
These standards are typically certified pre-mix solutions, which have been tested 
and re-tested for being accurate and reliable "markers" for the GC device. 
If an officer suspects that drugs are all or part of the impairing substance in 
your system, most states permit the officer to demand a blood sample, a urine sam-
ple, or both blood and urine. When a crime lab checks for drugs (other than alco-
hol), a different device is used. The internationally accepted "standard" for such 
testing is a "GC-MS" (gas chromatography, mass spectrophotometry) device. This 
piece of equipment is capable of isolating and identifying a wide range of drugs, 
including prescription drugs and illegal (contraband) drugs. It does this by match-
ing the digitally produced peaks appearing on a graph-like sheet of computer pa-
per. The computer tracks the time of the introduction of the sample and the exit of 
the sample from the device and then identifies the substance based on the retention 
time (how long it took the substance to pass through a column packed with inert 
material). Charts and notebooks are kept in the crime lab, which tell the lab scien-
tists how long each substance takes to pass through the column. That way, once the 
printout of the peaks is finished, the laboratory chemist can compare the time of re-
tention to the lab notebooks showing retention times for drugs or other chemicals. 
Furthermore, the laboratory will usually run a quick series of immunoassay 
tests on a different device before running the time-consuming GC-MS tests. These 
immunoassay tests are looking for common drugs of abuse, such as opiates, canna-
binoids (marijuana), sedatives, pain killers, etc. If these immunoassay tests come 
back negative, the lab will usually report that the sample did not have any type of 
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counter expert testimony. 12 The most serious criminal defense cases involve 
the intricacies of aggravating and mitigating factors in capital murder cases 
and researching the complicated rules of habeas corpus petitions. 13 For pub-
lic defenders, those attorneys working full-time representing the poor, the 
challenges of being an effective criminal defense attorney are increased 
because of the often crushing caseload14 and because, unlike privately re-
tained counsel, public defenders must represent every client to whom they 
are assigned. 15 
drugs in it. If any class of drugs shows positive, the GC-MS will be set up to look 
for common drugs in that class (e.g., sedatives) in the blood sample. 
Blood Test Information, DRUNKDR!V!NGDEFENSE.COM, http://www.drunkdrivingdefense. 
corn/general/blood-tests.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
12. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Proper Procedure in Con-
ducting Scientific Tests: Healing the Achilles Heel of Forensic Science, 43 CR!M. L. BULL. 5 
(2007). 
13. Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding 
and ProSe Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 973 n.20 (2012). The complexity of 
capital cases has an additional consequence for indigent defendants: 
As a result, few experienced lawyers are willing to take capital cases, and those 
who do lack the time and tools to do a thorough job. 
The problem is especially acute because capital cases are among the longest 
and most complex proceedings in our legal system, and capital defendants have the 
most at stake. Moreover, capital defense attorneys are often outgunned by prosecu-
tors who enjoy better pay and investigative and expert support as well as more ex-
perience and specialization in capital punishment. 
/d. at 973 (citing Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the 
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1844-49 (1993)). 
14. Data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics illustrate the heavy caseload handled 
by public defenders: 
In 2007, 22 states had a central administrative office that oversaw the opera-
tions and funding of all public defender offices within the state. Data from the 22 
state programs are reported at the state-level because within each state, state-based 
offices often share resources and caseloads, as needed. State public defender pro-
grams employed 4,300 (29%) of the nation's 15,000 public defenders and received 
1.5 million (27%) of the nearly 5.6 million cases received by public defenders na-
tionwide in 2007 . 
. . . Misdemeanors and ordinance violations accounted for more than 40% of the 
cases received. Felony non-capital cases made up a quarter of the incoming cases. 
Public defender programs in the 13 states that had the death penalty received 436 
death-penalty eligible cases in 2007. Numeric caseload standards recommend that 
a public defender should carry no more than 150 felony, 400 misdemeanor, 200 ju-
venile-related, or 25 appellate cases in a year. In 2007, four of the 17 state public 
defender programs reporting complete caseload data had a sufficient number of at-
torneys to handle the number of cases received in their office according to this 
guideline. 
Indigent Defense Systems, supra note 9. 
15. See generally PAUL B. W!CE, PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (2005). 
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Two recent United States Supreme Court cases have further burdened 
criminal defense attorneys, especially those attorneys who cannot refuse to 
represent a client. 16 In Indiana v. Edwards, the Supreme Court held that 
courts may appoint defense attorneys to represent those defendants who are 
competent to stand trial but not competent to proceed pro se, -even over the 
objection of the defendant. 17 In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that fail-
ing to inform a criminal defendant of the risk of deportation prior to plead-
ing guilty constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 18 Combined, these 
two cases unfairly burden defense attorneys while failing to significantly 
improve client representation. In particular, this Article will demonstrate the 
burden that these cases place on those who defend the poor. 19 
Although Padilla and Edwards address diverse, unrelated issues, both 
cases ultimately expand the traditional role of defense counsel. Padilla di-
rectly impacts that role by affirmatively requiring an additional duty when 
immigration issues are present.2° Edwards indirectly impacts defense coun-
sel.21 The defense attorney does not perform a psychiatric evaluation or 
make a competency decision.22 However, once a trial court rules a defendant 
incompetent for self-representation, the defense attorney must represent that 
defendant even if the defendant objects.23 The attorney must thus struggle 
with an uncooperative, mentally ill client whose illness interferes with rea-
soning and decision making. In order to represent an Edwards-incompetent 
defendant, the defense attorney's responsibilities necessarily increase and 
expand beyond the traditional defense role. 
Part I of this Article will describe the state of indigent defense today, 
in which large numbers of criminal defendants receive court-appointed 
counsel. Part II will analyze Edwards and Padilla and further explore their 
impact on the defense bar. Part III will offer solutions, including that the 
Court reformulate the competency standard and also assign to the trial court 
judge, the prosecutor, or an administrative body the responsibility of fully 
informing criminal defendants of the potential results of a criminal convic-
tion. 
16. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 
u.s. 164 (2008). 
17. 554 U.S. at 177-78. 
18. 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
19. See infra Part I. 
20. See 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
21. See 554 U.S. 164. 
22. /d. at 177-78. 
23. /d. 
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I. INDIGENT DEFENSE 
While Gideon ensured that no criminal defendant faced a felony con-
viction without legal assistance,Z4 and Strickland v. Washington required 
that all attorneys perform to a minimum level of competency,25 the reality of 
effective, zealous representation often fails to live up to these promises. 
Limited funding, insufficient training, and lack of supervision permeate the 
indigent defense system. 26 Additionally, constitutional law decisions, along 
with the complexity of criminal cases, require that the defense attorney mas-
ter complicated and voluminous case law.27 
When a criminal defendant cannot afford to hire an attorney, the trial 
court judge either assigns a court-appointed attorney or a public defender. 
However assigned, the Padilla and Edwards cases impact the defense attor-
ney in the same manner. This Article specifically assesses the impact of 
Padilla and Edwards on those who defend indigents, whether assigned, 
court-appointed, or public defenders, and uses these terms interchangea-
bly.zs 
Padilla will impact retained attorneys to a lesser degree. Retained at-
torneys are those hired by solvent criminal defendants.29 Since the client is 
solvent, the retained criminal defense attorney can simply consult with an 
immigration expert and bill the client. Without access to funds for an immi-
gration attorney, indigent defenders will now have an additional, unfunded 
responsibility. 
Edwards will likewise have less impact on retained attorneys because 
a criminal defendant requesting self-representation is unlikely to have re-
tained an attorney.30 Additionally, retained attorneys may withdraw if the 
client does not wish representation. Therefore, an Edwards incompetent 
defendant will be represented by an assigned attorney, not a retained one. 
The only attorneys who have no choice about whom they represent are the 
attorneys for the poor: public defenders and court-appointed attorneys. 
24. 372 u.s. 335, 344 (1963). 
25. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (stating that the Constitution guarantees effective 
assistance of counsel). 
26. Ken Armstrong, Florangela Davila & Justin Mayo, For Some, Free Counsel 
Comes at a High Cost, SEATILE TIMES (Apr. 4, 2004), http://seattletimes.nwsource. 
com/news/local/unequaldefense/stories/one/. 
27. This is especially true for death penalty defense attorneys. See generally Stephen 
B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 
Mo. L. REv. 683 (2010). 
28. See infra Part II. 
29. Cf Bruce J. Havighurst & Peter MacDougall, Note, The Representation of Indi-
gent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 579 (1963) 
(noting the Supreme Court's 1938 interpretation of the Sixth Amendment to entitle a crimi-
nal defendant, without financial resources to retain counsel, a court-appointed attorney). 
30. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975). 
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Defense attorneys for the indigent receive compensation rates vastly 
below retained attorneys.31 While funding for indigent defense varies among 
the states, and sometimes within one state, the administrative goal of public 
defender's offices is to defend as many cases for as little possible cost. In-
deed, some indigent defense counsel actively promote the amount of money 
they can save a jurisdiction. In an election campaign, one public defender 
"also emphasized his record of financial responsibility, returning roughly $1 
million to the state from his budget during his tenure."32 Although there are 
some well-funded indigent defense systems, they are the exception. 
Indigent defense attorneys receive insufficient training prior to being 
abandoned into the courtroom to represent some of the most vulnerable cli-
ents: "It's not shocking to learn that many of the 218 DNA exonerees were 
represented by public defenders at trial. They were all innocent, but they all 
lost. In some cases, overburdened, inexperienced and underfunded public 
defenders were simply not equipped to stand up against the state.'m 
Lack of training prior to first representing a criminal before a jury trial 
is not unusual. One public defender explained, "It was pretty traumatic[. My 
boss] told me the best way to learn was sink or swim."34 
Low salaries for indigent defense attorneys often coexist with crushing 
caseloads.35 The focus in the modem criminal justice system values effi-
31. See generally Barton & Bibas, supra note 13. Another dramatic example is 
Attorney Parker, who went from an associate in a private law firm in New York City to 
becoming an assistant public defender in Louisiana. See, e.g, David Winkler-Schmit, The 
Life of a New Orleans Public Defender, GAMBIT (Feb. 21, 2009), 
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/the-life-of-a-new-orleans-public-
defender/Content?oid=l255673 ("By accepting a position in New Orleans, Parker's salary 
went from $170,000 per year to $40,000. "). 
32. Charles Broward, Public Defender Matt Shirk Easily Wins 2nd Term Despite 
Questions About Experience, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/20 12-08-14/story/public-defender -matt-shirk -easily-
wins-2nd-term-despite-questions-about; see also Armstrong, Davila & Mayo, supra note 26 
("Local government officials say fixed-fee public-defense contracts allow them to control 
costs. Critics say such contracts strip lawyers of any financial motivation to do a good job, 
and render indigent defense an empty promise. 'It produces tremendous economic disincen-
tives, and it raises real questions about the quality of service provided to the accused."' 
(quoting former Washington Supreme Court Justice Phil Talmadge)). 
33. 'McJustice'-the Crisis of Indigent Defense in America, Innocence Blog, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT (July 15, 2008, 4:10 PM), 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/McJustice _the_ crisis_ of_indigent_ defense _in_ America 
.php. 
34. Armstrong, Davila & Mayo, supra note 26. 
35. "Other felony and misdemeanor defendants likewise have overworked, under-
funded lawyers who quickly press them to plead guilty. The result is an epidemic of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel." Barton & Bibas, supra note 13, at 972. The top assistant defender 
in one Virginia office explained that "the low salaries and high caseloads make it hard to 
recruit and retain attorneys." Bill Freehling, Poor Defendants Get Shortchanged, Public 
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ciency over justice. Criminal defense attorneys sometimes act as mere cogs 
in the conviction machine. "We wax poetically about justice for all[,] .... 
[a]nd yet you go into courthouses all over the country, and what you see is 
not at all what is being celebrated. What you see is people being processed 
like widgets on an assembly line."36 The crushing caseload somewhat ex-
plains the lack of individualized attention to a client's case. One chief public 
defender explained, '"We had an attorney [last year] who blew through 500 
cases in a year, most of them felonies .... You can't confidently represent 
these folks [with that kind of caseload]. "'37 Two recent Supreme Court cases 
further complicate the job of the street-crime level defense attorney, requir-
ing that the defense attorney role expand to include legal matters involving 
psychiatry and immigration law.38 
II. THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
Criminal defense attorneys must have the flexibility to address multi-
ple complex subjects. Competent defense attorneys must further exhibit 
proficiency in evidence, constitutional law, criminal law, and criminal pro-
cedure so as to effectively defend the client. Such representation may in-
clude consultation with professionals from other areas, such as psychiatry 
and immigration law. However, consultation differs from expertise. The 
Court now requires that criminal defense attorneys master areas far beyond 
criminal defense. 
A. Indiana v. Edwards 
1. The Dusky Standard 
For many years, the Supreme Court equated competency to stand trial 
with competency to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Dusky v. 
United States defined competency to stand trial as "whether [the defendant] 
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."39 In 1993, the Su-
preme Court reemphasized the Dusky standard and found that "there is no 
Defender Salaries Low, Caseloads Heavy, FREE LANCE-STAR (Sept. 3, 2006), 
http://fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2006/092006/09032006/211119/index _ html. 
36. Armstrong, Davila & Mayo, supra note 26. 
3 7. Winkler-Schmit, supra note 31 (quoting Chief Public Defender for New Orleans 
Parish Derwyn Bunton). 
38. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 (2008); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 
S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
39. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) 
(quoting id. ). 
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reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably 
higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitu-
tional rights."4° Following the Faretta v. California holding that a criminal 
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right of self-representation,41 the Su-
preme Court seemingly held that as long as a criminal defendant was Dusky 
competent, he was also competent to waive his right to counsel and assert 
his right to represent himself.42 
Thus, the law seemed settled until the Supreme Court developed an 
exception to the right Of self-representation in Indiana v. Edwards.43 The 
trial court judge refused to allow Edwards to represent himself.44 On appeal, 
the Indiana courts ruled that such refusal deprived him of his Sixth 
Amendment right to represent himself.45 The Supreme Court reversed that 
ruling, fmding that the trial court did not violate the Sixth Amendment when 
it forced Edwards to be represented by a defense attorney over his objec-
tion.46 In Edwards, the Court announced an exception to the right of self-
representation for the mentally ill, holding that "the Constitution permits 
States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough 
to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to 
the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by 
themselves."47 Essentially, two competency standards for counsel waiver 
currently exist: one for those who suffer from a mental illness and one for 
those who do not. 
Scholars have responded to the Supreme Court's ruling in Edwards. 
Criticisms include objections to the disparate treatment of the mentally ill 
and to the argument that the Edwards Court failed to address the weakness-
es in the Dusky standard.48 These criticisms point to weaknesses that, if cor-
40. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-99 (1993). 
41. 422 u.s. 806,807,844-45 (1975). 
42. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398; see also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87-88 (2004); 
Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966,969-70 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
43. 554 u.s. 164, 178 (2008). 
44. !d. at 169. 
45. /d. 
46. /d.atl69,179. 
47. !d. at 178. 
48. See Joanmarie Haria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 324-30 (2009); see also John H. Blume & Morgan J. Clark "Un-
well": Indiana v. Edwards and the Fate of Mentally Ill ProSe Defendants, 21 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. PoL'Y 151, 163-66 (2011) (discussing the failure of Edwards to improve the plight of 
the mentally ill and post-Edwards pro se competency hearings); E. Lea Johnston, Represen-
tational Competence: Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 523, 525-26, 530-32 (2011); Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Com-
petence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 259, 273-77, 302-03 (2009). 
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rected, would obviate the need for disparate competency standards.49 This 
Article focuses on the fact that Edwards primarily burdens the defense at-
torney while doing nothing to ensure the defendant's rights to a fair trial and 
a vigorous defense are observed. 50 
2. The Edwards Standard 
The Edwards decision requires that, if a trial court finds a Dusky-
competent defendant incompetent to proceed pro se, a defense attorney must 
be appointed against the defendant's will and over his objection.51 The 
court-imposed defense attorney will then have the right, and perhaps even 
the duty, to overrule any decisions that the defendant wishes to make in his 
own defense, including what defense to raise, what witnesses to call, and 
what trial strategy to take. 52 · 
The Court justifies this decision by creating a non-legal and non-
medical description of the Dusky-competent defendant who is nevertheless 
incompetent to represent himself.53 The Court likened the situation in Ed-
wards to Godinez v. Moran, where the Court found that the competency 
standard to proceed was identical to the competency standard to stand tri-
al,54 explaining that "[b ]oth involve a mental condition that falls in a gray 
area between Dusky's minimal constitutional requirement that measures a 
defendant's ability to stand trial and a somewhat higher standard that 
measures mental fitness for another legal purpose."55 After this description, 
the Court continues to refer to the "gray-area defendant" throughout the 
decision, as if the term conveyed a meaningful legal or psychiatric con-
cept.56 For example, the Court misleadingly references the earlier Godinez 
case analysis as if the Court had invoked this terminology previously: "One 
49. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For a detailed analysis with 
suggestions for fixing the Dusky standard, see generally Davoli, supra note 48. 
50. See infra Subsections II.A.3-5. 
51. 554 U.S. at 177-78 ("We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits 
judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking 
whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to 
do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel 
for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe men-
tal illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by them-
selves."). 
52. "But the problem of the Colin Ferguson trial was not that Mr. Ferguson was 
representing himself; that was only a symptom of the problem. The problem was that Fergu-
son was psychotic and should not have been tried in the first place." Ronald L. Kuby & Wil-
liam M. Kunstler, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: The Colin Ferguson Trial and the Compe-
tency Standard, 5 CORNELLJ.L. & PuB. POL'Y 19,20 (1995). 
53. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172. 
54. /d.; 509 U.S. 389, 399-400,402 (1993). 
55. 554 U.S. at 172. 
56. The term "gray-area" is used four more times in the opinion. /d. at 173-74. 
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might argue that Godinez's grant (to a State) of permission to allow a gray-
area defendant self-representation must implicitly include permission to 
deny self-representation."57 The problem with any argument about 
Godinez's reference to "gray-area defendants" is that such a concept was 
simply never considered by the Godinez decision because such a concept 
had never existed prior to its invention in Edwards. 
Perhaps to justify its decision in Edwards, the Court needed to develop 
a concept that expressed its belief that a Dusky-competent defendant could 
somehow not be a Godinez-competent defendant. Unfortunately, the Court 
continues to exhibit a lack of sophistication concerning serious mental ill-
nesses. 58 Because the Court does not understand the link between mental 
illness and incompetency, it invented the concept of a "gray-area defend-
ant." This new term ignores the reality that the Dusky competency standard 
sometimes results in mentally ill individuals who are psychotic and delu-
sional nevertheless being found competent to stand trial. 59 
Instead of honestly confronting the failings of the Dusky standard, the 
Court attempts to solve the problem of incompetent defendants asserting 
their right to self-representation by pretending that "gray-area defendants" 
constitute a legitimate, easily defined, and already recognized category.60 
57. !d. at 173. 
58. See generally Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo's Nest: Why Do 
Courts Continue to Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REv. 987 
(2002). See also Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incar-
ceration of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and 
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the 
Insanity Defense, 5 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y I, 22 (2005); Emily C. Lieberman, Forced 
Medication and the Need to Protect the Rights of the Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 5 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 479, 485 (2007); Katherine L. Smith, Comment, Lost 
Souls: Constitutional Implications for the Deficiencies in Treatment for Persons with Mental 
Illness in Custody, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497, 500-18 (2012). 
59. "Any practicing criminal defense attorney has a number of stories involving 
seriously mentally ill defendants who were found competent to stand trial." Blume & Clark, 
supra note 48, at 166; see also Davoli, supra note 48, at 315; Davis v. Woodford, 333 F.3d 
982, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding defendant competent under Dusky despite having a 
hysterical conversion disorder during penalty phase because psychologist gave no indication 
defendant was incompetent at time of trial and defendant's behavior did not indicate incom-
petence); United States v. Morrison, !53 F.3d 34, 39-40,46 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding defend-
ant competent under Dusky despite psychologist's inability to rule out "grandiose or paranoid 
delusions" because psychologist found "no clear evidence" of need for care and testified 
defendant understood charges and could assist counsel (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
60. The Court goes so far as to attach a pleading to the Edwards appendix that 
demonstrates how grueling it would be for a court to try a case involving an annoying, delu-
sional prose defendant. 554 U.S. at 176, 179. Rather than demonstrating Edwards' inability 
to represent himself, however, the pleading merely demonstrates that the Dusky standard has 
failed to prevent a finding of competency with an obviously mentally ill and delusional de-
fendant. See Brief for Respondent at 2-5,24-29, Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208). 
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They do not. There is no such psychiatric or psychological term.61 Prior to 
the Court's invention in Edwards, there was likewise no such legal term. 
Once the Court announced the concept of the "gray-area defendant," the 
Court eliminated the distressing spectacle of hallucinating and delusional 
defendants representing themselvesY This absolves the trial court judge 
from having to maintain courtroom decorum through the disruptions of the 
untreated mentally ill defendant.63 While there is no resolution of the fail-
ures of the Dusky standard, the Court has nevertheless successfully reas-
signed the role of psychiatrist, or perhaps even social worker, to the defense 
attorney. 
Of course, not every criminal defense attorney will be forced to repre-
sent a client who objects to the representation. The Court has specifically 
reassigned the role of forced-attorney to the defenders of the indigent who 
cannot refuse appointment: public defenders and court-appointed attorneys. 
Attorneys who are privately retained have the luxury of refusing to accept 
cases for which they choose not to enter an appearance. 64 Those who are 
court appointed or work for a public defender service do not have such a 
choice.65 Taking this reality into account, the Edwards decision seems writ-
ten by individuals who lack any insight into attorney-client relationships 
and trial practice. 
3. Defending Edwards 
The facts of the Edwards case demonstrate the difficulty of represent-
ing both the incompetent and the uncooperative. Defense counsel made nu-
merous requests that his client be found incompetent. 66 While the record is 
silent on the client's reaction, the Court failed to acknowledge that request-
61. See generally THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS,§ 309.81 (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n 4th ed.) (1994). 
62. Indeed, that seems to be the goal of the Edwards decision: "[G]iven the defend-
ant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation 
at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling." 554 U.S. at 176. 
63. "Once the right of self-representation for the mentally ill is a sometime thing, 
trial judges will have every incentive to make their lives easier-to avoid the painful necessi-
ty of deciphering occasional pleadings of the sort contained in the Appendix to today's opin-
ion-by appointing knowledgeable and literate counsel." !d. at 189 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
64. Private attorneys are under no obligation to accept court-appointed clients either. 
See Freehling, supra note 35 ("The rest are done by court-appointed attorneys .... [M]any 
lawyers won't do court-appointed work because of the unwaiveable fee caps that Virginia 
places on non-capital cases."). 
65. WICE, supra note 15, at x-xi, 13. 
66. 554 U.S. at 167-68. 
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ing a competency hearing or raising an insanity defense often produces a 
tense, if not hostile, attorney-client standoff.67 
In August 2000, five months after arrest, Edwards's court-appointed 
counsel asked for a psychiatric evaluation.68 The court found Edwards in-
competent at that hearing and sent him to the state hospital for evaluation 
and treatment.69 After Edwards's doctors determined him to be competent 
seven months later, his attorney again requested a psychiatric evaluation.70 
The trial court held another hearing in March 2002, but at that time found 
Edwards to be Dusky competent.71 In November 2002, Edwards's attorney 
requested another competency hearing and at that time presented expert 
testimony "showing that Edwards was suffering from serious thinking diffi-
culties and delusions."72 Specifically, one expert testified that Edwards was 
"unable to cooperate with his attorney in his defense because of his schizo-
phrenic illness; [h ]is delusions and his marked difficulties in thinking make 
it impossible for him to cooperate with his attorney."73 He was again found 
incompetent. 74 
Absent from the Supreme Court's Edwards analysis is any recognition 
of the difficulties of this situation from the defense attorney's perspective. 
Three times prior to trial, the defense attorney made motions for expert psy-
chiatric assistance and twice the trial court specifically found that Ed-
wards's illness interfered with his ability to cooperate with his attomey.75 
Yet nowhere did the trial court analyze the impact on the attorney-client 
relationship of the attorney having to draw the court's attention to the fact 
that he could not communicate with his client, likely while that client was 
sitting in the courtroom beside the attorney.76 The Supreme Court likewise 
67. See generally id. at 166-79. See also MARK C. BARDWELL & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, 
CRIMINAL COMPETENCY ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF COLIN FERGUSON 338-39 (2002) ("Questions 
surfaced regarding [the Unabomber Ted] Kaczynski's mental health and his relationship with 
defense counsel. These matters soon became one and the same as a profound conflict devel-
oped between Kaczynski and his attorneys over a mental defect defense. Kaczynski wanted 
to avoid being portrayed as a 'sickie' while his defense team intimated that a mental status 
defense would either be the case in chief or implemented during the penalty phase." (cita-
tions omitted)). 
68. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 167. Thus, from the very beginning of the case, Edwards 
did not have the means or ability to retain his own attorney and was assigned one by the trial 
court. See id. 
69. !d. 
70. !d. at 168. 
71. /d. 
72. /d. 
73. !d. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
74. /d. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 66-74. 
76. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 167-69. Capital murder defendant Juan Carlos 
Chavez's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase was not compel-
ling because Chavez's refusal to cooperate negatively impacted counsel's performance. 
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failed to acknowledge the difference between a client who cannot cooperate 
with counsel and one who cannot communicate with the attorney. 
The Dusky standard does not mention the client's need to cooperate, a 
term which indicates that the defendant is acting with some willfulness in 
refusing to do so.77 Instead, Dusky requires that the defendant be able "'to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing. "'78 These terms have distinct meanings. To consult with indicates an 
equal or perhaps even a subservient role for the attorney.79 The client con-
sults with the attorney on a multitude of issues from arrest to final verdict, 
yet the client retains the autonomy to make final decisions. To cooperate 
with inverts the relationship and indicates that it is somehow the client's job 
to "be cooperative," instead of the attorney's role to assist the defendant. 
This subtle shift in the attorney-client relationship strips the defendant 
of power and autonomy, relegating the defendant to a minor role in his own 
case. The Edwards case clearly demonstrates this phenomenon. As part of 
his motion to proceed pro se at his first trial, Edwards "complained in detail 
that the attorney representing him had not spent adequate time preparing 
and was not sharing legal materials for use in his defense."80 Despite his 
display of an understanding of the legal process and his ability to answer 
questions concerning trial procedure, the trial court denied his motion. 
[Edwards] explained that he and his attorney disagreed about which defense to pre-
sent to the attempted murder charge. Edwards' counsel favored lack of intent to 
kill; Edwards, self-defense. As the defendant put it: "My objection is me and my 
Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 209-10 (Fla. 2009). "Here, limitations were imposed on 
counsel due to Chavez's refusal to provide certain facts with regard to his background." /d. at 
209. The "Long Island Railroad Shooter," Colin Ferguson, objected to the presentation of 
any psychiatric evidence for his defense by his defense attorneys. See BARDWELL & ARRIGO, 
supra note 67, at 162-63 ("From the outset of the direct examination, Mr. Ferguson proved to 
[be] a combative defendant. For example, when Mr. Kuby [defense attorney] attempted to 
enter several items into evidence used by Dr. Dudley to render his medical opinion, Ferguson 
passionately objected, raising legal issues about attorney-client confidentiality."). 
77. See also supra Subsection II.A.l. 
78. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (emphasis added) (quoting the solicitor general). 
79. Professor Thomas H. Shaffer has written extensively about the attorney-client 
relationship: 
The lawyer as godfather wants client victory, the lawyer as hired gun wants client 
autonomy, the lawyer as guru wants client rectitude, and the lawyer as friend wants 
client goodness. Each of the lawyers has a different combination of answers to two 
questions: (1) Who controls the representation? and (2) Do the interests of those 
other than the client matter? 
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 88 (2d ed. 2009). 
80. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 181 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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attorney actually had discussed a defense, ... and we are in disagreement with 
it. ,gl 
Although Edwards was the only individual who would suffer a conse-
quence if he was convicted, and despite the fact that Edwards clearly and 
coherently articulated a significant disagreement in how his case would be 
defended while simultaneously displaying an understanding of trial proce-
dure, the Supreme Court found he lacked the competency to proceed.82 
Yet Edwards did not appear to be exhibiting a "gray-area" lack of 
competence between Dusky competence and a competency level commiser-
ate with waiving counsel. Rather, he was apparently disagreeing with or 
being "uncooperative" with his attorney. While rejecting an attorney's ad-
vice may not be advisable or prudent, there is nothing inherently irrational 
about that decision. Attorneys are not fortunetellers. They cannot predict a 
future that is somehow unknown by everyone else. Rather, attorneys are 
experts in the law and legal procedure and give advice based on their per-
ception of the strength of the prosecution's case, the viability of a defense, 
and numerous other factors. Prior to Edwards, one important factor had 
always been the wishes of the client.83 
4. The Attorney--Client Relationship 
Not only did the Court punish Edwards by stripping him of both his 
right to proceed and the right to choose his defense because he was appar-
ently uncooperative, but the Court also brushed over the deterioration of the 
attorney-client relationship while exhibiting a startlingly naivete about in-
terpersonal relationships in general. The Court never addressed the fact that 
moving to have a client declared incompetent often severely damages the 
attorney-client relationship.84 An attorney who makes a competency motion 
81. /d. (citation omitted). 
82. Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez 
and Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 391, 392 (2009). 
83. In each of Professor Thomas L. Shaffer's attorney-client relationship types, the 
attorney consults and determines the client's wishes. See SHAFFER & CocHRAN, JR., supra 
note 79, at 3-4. 
84. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 167-79. The notorious Unabomber case of Ted Ka-
czynski illustrates the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship when the client rejects 
the representation of defense counsel. Kaczynski's attorneys were court-appointed, and in-
tended to raise a defense that included evidence concerning his mental illness. BARDWELL & 
ARRIGO, supra note 67, at 339-40 ("While the attorneys advanced their 'impaired capacity' 
defense plan, the tension between Kaczynski and his counselors grew and eventually erupted 
when the accused rejected in open court any form of an impaired mental status defense. 
These very volatile and contentious psycho legal matters consumed much of the pretrial phase 
of the case. Interposing requests for new counsel and imploring the judge to rule on who 
ultimately controlled the mental status defense, the unabomber endeavored to identify op-
tions to resolve the obvious and deep conflict involving the defense team and Kaczynski on 
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may do so over the objection of the client, and clients typically resent the 
attorney who is supposed to be advocating for their defense, instead "telling 
on" the client to the court. 85 
While some clients may return from being restored to competency 
with a more "cooperative" attitude toward the defense attorney,86 many re-
turn still resentful of the attorney's role in subjecting the client to involun-
tary psychiatric treatment.87 After Edwards, a client who is Dusky compe-
tent but rejects his attorney's advice has no right of self-representation. This 
decision not only unfairly singles out the mentally ill, but it particularly 
treats the indigent as having fewer rights than those of financial means. 88 
Criminal defendants with the means to hire an attorney still retain the au-
tonomy of whom to hire if the trial court finds that defendant to be Ed-
wards-incompetent. However, indigent criminal defendants have no such 
choice. An indigent defendant denied the right to self-representation must 
the issue of the mental health evidence. Judge Garland Burrell who presided over the Ka-
czynski matter denied the defendant's request for new counsel, suggesting that it was 'un-
timely' and further ruled that his lawyers were entrusted with determining whether or not a 
mental status defense was warranted in the case. As a result of the Judge's ruling and to 
escape the impending presentation of a mental status defense, Kaczynski (evidently that very 
evening) attempted suicide." (citations omitted)). 
85. Colin Ferguson, the "Long Island Railroad Shooter," demonstrated this phenom-
enon by firing attorneys who attempted to notify the court of his incompetency and insanity. 
!d. at 248-49 ('"Well we see Anthony Falanga, the first attorney .... No cooperation from 
Mr. Ferguson. And again, Mr. Ferguson makes up a wild series of allegations about Mr. 
Falanga, none of which are true. Mr. Falanga gets discharged, and Mr. Ferguson calls us up 
and asks us if we would take the case. We agree to do so. And after a very short honeymoon 
we too become the people who are conspiring against him .... We are accused of making 
him go blind and accused of conspiring with you [Judge Belfi] and ultimately accused of 
being part of a murder plot with the D.A. and Nassau County Sheriffs' Department and the 
Court."' (citation omitted)). 
86. Cf Lori H. Colwell & Julie Gianesini, Demographic, Criminogenic, and Psy-
chiatric Factors That Predict Competency Restoration, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
297, 304 (2011) ("Likewise, some patients who required special observation were those who 
had significant behavior problems. This inability to control their behavior may serve as a 
marker of their inability to work with or assist counsel or to maintain appropriate courtroom 
behavior."). 
87. In Colin Ferguson's pretrial hearing to dismiss his attorneys and proceed prose, 
the prosecutor comments on this complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, 
using the breakdown as evidence of the defendant's rationality. BARDWELL & ARRIGO, supra 
note 67, at 252-55 ('"Now, in this court of law for the first time I believe Mr. Kuby [defense 
counsel] has called him [Mr. Ferguson] insane .... You can see from the tone of the letters 
and the history of this particular case that what Mr. Ferguson is most annoyed with, and he 
asked you [Judge Belfi] on numerous occasions to shut them up by means of a restraining 
order, what he is most annoyed with is Mr. Kunstler [defense counsel] and Mr. Kuby making 
public statements which are disseminated in the media telling the world that he is crazy; that 
he is insane."' (citation omitted)). 
88. See Davoli, supra note 48, at 321. 
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also accept whichever attorney is forced on him against his will-and all 
decisions made by that attorney.89 
In so deciding, the Court neglects to consider the issue from the de-
fense attorney's perspective, and particularly the perspective of the attorney 
who cannot refuse a case: the indigent client's defender. Typically, even if a 
client disagrees with some decisions, at least the client has requested the 
representation.90 After Edwards, the indigent defender will now be repre-
senting the unwilling. 
In Edwards, the Court never once mentions, apparently because the is-
sue never occurs to them, the difficulties of forcing an attorney upon an 
objecting client. A client who does not wish to be represented by an attor-
ney may simply choose not to meet with the attorney or with any defense 
experts hired by the attorney, whether or not the client is incarcerated.91 
Thus, basic issues of representation will simply never be discussed. Such 
issues include: discovering whether or not there is a potential defense to the 
charge and if so, which defense to select; how to locate potential defense 
witnesses; whether or not to accept a plea offer; and whether or not any 
suppression or other pretrial issues exist. If a case then proceeds to trial, the 
Court likewise fails to imagine a trial in which the client and the attorney 
are estranged, but are forced to sit next to one another.92 An attorney repre-
89. Jd. at 327-28. 
90. "Thus, in order for the defendant's right to call his own witnesses, to cross-
examine witnesses, and to put on a defense to be anything more than 'a tenuous and unac-
ceptable legal fiction,' a defendant must have consented to the representation of counsel." 
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 188 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975)). 
91. In a death penalty prosecution, defendant Chavez undermined his own defense 
by his lack of cooperation: 
In addition, counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigation testimony 
based on the client's self-imposed limitations. Lead counsel testified that it was 
necessary to mislead Chavez to convince him to even confer with Dr. Quintana be-
cause Chavez did not want to present penalty-phase mitigation. At first, lead coun-
sel informed Chavez that Dr. Quintana was only going to evaluate him as it related 
to the guilt phase. When the time to conduct a follow-up interview arrived, lead 
counsel testified that Chavez refused to participate. 
Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 210 (Fla. 2009). In another case, defendant 
Colin Ferguson objected to any sort of psychiatric evaluation. According to [de-
fense attorneys], the only reason Mr. Ferguson met with the defense psychiatrist at 
all was because he presumed Dr. Dudley was the eye doctor whom he had request-
ed to see. After the initial visit, Ferguson refused all forms of follow-up meetings, 
precluding a complete psychiatric examination. 
BARDWELL & ARRIGO, supra note 67, at 162 (citations omitted). 
92. See id. at 244, 246. While arguing that his client, Colin Ferguson, was incompe-
tent to stand trial, defense counsel emphasized that Ferguson "suffers from delusional disor-
der persecutory type. He has firm and fixed and unshakeable delusions of persecution. He is 
incapable of forming any relationship on the basis of trust. He is incapable of trusting another 
attorney, any attorney, enough to rationally evaluate the advice that attorney provides." Id. 
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senting a client over that client's objection can only be said to be represent-
ing that client through the absurd reasoning of the Edwards decision. From 
the client's perspective, that attorney is hostile to the client and is colluding 
with the government in forcing the client to accept the representation.93 
Most significantly, as noted by Justice Scalia in his Edwards dissent, 
the forced indigent defender is now making decisions over the defendant's 
objection but for which the defendant alone remains responsible.94 The Sixth 
Amendment reserves trials rights to the defendant, not the defense attorney: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by Jaw, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.95 
Even though the Sixth Amendment clearly states that the accused en-
joys all these trial rights, Justice Scalia explains that it is the defense attor-
ney who typically asserts such rights: 
Our trial system, however, allows the attorney representing a defendant "full au-
thority to manage the conduct of the trial"-an authority without which "[t]he ad-
versary process could not function effectively." We have held that "the client must 
accept the consequences of the lawyer's decision to forgo cross-examination, to 
decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose the 
identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial." Thus, in order for the defendant's 
right to call his own witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses, and to put on a defense 
to be anything more than "a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction," a defendant 
must have consented to the representation of counsel.96 
Justice Scalia demonstrates that the legitimacy of the attorney's role· 
stems from the consent of the accused.97 Yet, an Edwards indigent defend-
ant is a "client" who specifically has not consented and has objected to the 
representation of the attorney sitting next to him and arguing on his behalf.98 
A forced indigent client's defense attorney must somehow zealously 
represent a client who does not want him there. Likely conversations at 
counsel table will include the defense attorney attempting to control a client 
who actively objects-probably in a hissing and distracting voice in the 
93. The Court noted that "[b]ut to hold that a defendant may be deprived of the right 
to make legal arguments for acquittal simply because a state-selected agent has made differ-
ent arguments on his behalf is, as Justice Frankfurter wrote in Adams ... to 'imprison a man 
in his privileges and call it the Constitution."' Edwards, 554 U.S. at 189 (quoting Adams v. 
United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)). 
94. !d. at 188. 
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
96. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 188 (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,418 (1988); 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821). 
97. ld. 
98. ld. at 188-89. 
Attorneys for the Indigent: Psychiatry & Immigration Law 1167 
attorney's ear-to the attorney's every decision.99 Such situations are not 
uncommon even when the defendant has requested counsel. 100 
An Edwards-incompetent defendant may not only disagree with the 
attorney's strategy, defense, and questions, but may object to that attorney's 
entire presence. The Supreme Court has previously outlined the duties of 
defense counsel: 
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's func-
tion is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty ofloyalty, a 
duty to avoid conflicts of interest. From counsel's function as assistant to the de-
fendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more 
particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep 
the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. 
Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the 
trial a reliable adversarial testing process. 101 
The defense attorney representing the objecting Edwards-competent 
client will struggle with each of these duties. The defense attorney will not 
know how to be loyal to someone who is asking him to go away and not 
sharing any of his thoughts with the attorney. The attorney can hardly avoid 
a conflict of interest when the entire relationship is based upon the obvious 
conflict that the attorney's interest (forced upon him by the court) is to rep-
resent the client, and the client's interest is the exact opposite. Counsel is 
required to assist the defendant who wants no assistance, to advocate for the 
client by rejecting what the client wants advocated (such as the self-defense 
claim in Edwards), 102 to consult with the client on important decisions that 
the client does not get to make anyway, and to keep the defendant who 
wants nothing to do with the attorney informed of important developments. 
Such a situation is not only absurd, but also actually impossible. Counsel's 
duty to bring "skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adver-
sarial testing process"103 seems the only duty listed by the Court in Strick-
land that an attorney might be able to fulfill even when the client does not 
want representation. 
Perhaps Edwards himself inadvertently deceived the Supreme Court 
into believing that such a relationship is possible by his behavior at trial. 
99. Similarly, in the effective assistance of counsel area, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that merely standing beside a client does not make an attorney effective. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
I 00. There exists an entire body of literature dedicated to assisting attorneys with 
client representation. See, e.g., Jeanette Kinard, Personality Disorders, or Why Is My Client 
Such a Jerk?, VOICE FOR DEF., Nov. 2010, at 24, available at 
http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/-aedavis4/mhpdarticle.pdf. 
101. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
I 02. "The result will be what may well have occurred in Edwards: a competent, 
autonomous defendant will be prevented from telling his own story and forced, instead, to 
listen to a lawyer tell an entirely different one." Slobogin, supra note 75 at 411. 
103. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
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"Edwards was not even allowed to begin to represent himself, and because 
he was respectful and compliant and did not provide a basis to conclude a 
trial could not have gone forward had he been allowed to press his own 
claims."'04 Thus, despite disagreeing with the entire manner in which he was 
being defended, Edwards sat still and didn't disrupt the proceedings, some-
how validating the Court's perspective that cooperation equates with Dusky 
competence. 105 
Seasoned trial attorneys are only too familiar with the clients who 
aren't cooperative and have to be reasoned, persuaded, and sometimes even 
coerced into agreeing to certain decisions. 106 At least in those instances, the 
attorney acts with the conviction that the client desired the representation. A 
forced indigent defense attorney acts with no authority from the client what-
soever, and perhaps without even a client with whom to consult. 
Mentally ill clients who object to representation often lack the cooper-
ative nature assumed by the Supreme Court. One dramatic example oc-
curred during a competency hearing in August 2012, for defendant Rashad 
Riddick. 107 Accused of a triple murder and facing a potential death sentence, 
the defendant's personal objection to court-appointed counsel completely 
disrupted his hearing. 108 "From the start, Riddick was visibly agitated, 
screaming out whenever the judge attempted to question defense attorneys 
about the outcome of his recent mental assessment at Central State Hospital 
in Petersburg."109 When his attorney tried to speak, Riddick interrupted with 
his own objection. '"I am objecting to anything he says,' Riddick called out. 
'I don't give a shit what he says. "'110 The hearing ended when the defendant 
"exploded into an apparent fit of rage" and "repeatedly punched court-
appointed attorney Joseph Flood, of Fairfax, in the face about 15 minutes 
into the hearing."'" 
Despite the assault, the defense attorney continued to vigorously rep-
resent his now absent client. "Flood attributed the explosive incident to the 
preceding testimony about 'the touchy issue' of Riddick's mental health. 'It 
104. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 185-86 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105. See id. 
I 06. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, JR., supra note 79, at 9 ("Lawyers manipulated clients 
to settle by exaggerating the risks of loss. They maintained control of cases by portraying law 
as an 'insider's game' where they had the necessary connections with public authorities. The 
lawyers portrayed even simple concepts of law in complex, unclear terms that clients could 
not understand. When trying to persuade clients, '[t]hey construct[ed] meanings in the ser-
vice of[their] own power."' (citations omitted)). 
107. See Allison Brophy Champion, Riddick Assaults Defense Attorney, STAR 
EXPONENT (Aug. I, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.dailyprogress.com/starexponent/news/ 
local news/article d5241 fe6-2c45-5efe-8d8c-c6dfdf605da6.htrnl. 
- -
108. !d. 
109. !d. 
110. !d. 
Ill. !d. 
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has been our position he has serious mental health issues,' Flood said."112 
Riddick's case demonstrates the difficulty of raising issues of competency 
or insanity over the objections of the defendant. "The defense attorney said 
Riddick is 'extremely uncomfortable' discussing anything to do with his 
mental health issues." 113 Thus, the defense attorney must attempt to develop 
a defense to which his client is literally violently opposed to asserting. 
Under such circumstances, a defense attorney may struggle to provide 
a competent defense, and this ultimately harms the defendant. While de-
fending a case on insufficiency of the evidence grounds may be possible 
without the client's involvement, there is little else that can be accomplished 
over a client's objection and without the client's approval. 114 The attorney is 
limited to challenging the prosecution's case without information and assis-
tance typically gleaned through client interaction that enables the attorney to 
counter the damaging evidence. 
Motions to suppress involuntary confessions would lack the powerful 
testimony of the defendant. Additionally: 
[A defendant] who is forced to accept a lawyer and a defense not of his choosing, 
could take the witness stand and proclaim his sanity, while condemning the insani-
ty defense as a trick cooked up by his lawyer and the court. Defense counsel would 
be powerless in these circumstances and the prosecution, during cross-examination 
of the defendant, would be able to further undermine the defense that neither the 
prosecutor nor the defendant wanted in the first place. 115 
Images such as these may be hard to discern from the viewpoint of the 
Supreme Court bench, but indigent defense attorneys can typically relate 
similar scenarios. 116 
Remarkable in its absence from the Court's discussion is the impact of 
the Edwards decision on the most routine issue facing criminal defendants: 
whether or not to accept a plea offer. The majority of modem criminal cases 
112. /d. 
113. /d. 
114. "But as a practical matter, it is impossible to force a psychiatric defense on an 
unwilling defendant. A defendant cannot be compelled, by his own counsel, to consult with, 
confide in, or even meet with a psychiatrist." Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 52, at 21 (citing 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 730.30 (McKinney 1994)). 
115. /d.at22. 
116. "How will one make the fine distinction between a defendant's lack of compe-
tence to represent himself (given all the complex tasks involved) and his mere bad judgment? 
Will we be able to distinguish a mentally ill defendant's decision to put forth a poorly con-
ceived or disadvantageous defense from an illogical defense that flows from his mental ill-
ness? Will more serious charges require a higher level of competence for the defendant who 
represents himself pro se?'' James L. Knoll IV, Dignity in the Gray Zone, Indiana v. Ed-
wards, 25 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 13 (2008) (discussing how difficult the new Edwards standard 
is to apply). 
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are resolved, not through trial, but through guilty pleas. 117 Criminal defense 
attorneys and prosecutors typically plea bargain, thereby expediting case 
resolutions. An Edwards-incompetent client who refuses to meet with the 
attorney whom he has already rejected will not be a party to the plea bargain 
process, yet the attorney may feel as though the plea bargain is the best pos-
sible result for the client. 
5. Symptoms of Mental Illness 
The Supreme Court fails to explain how a defense attorney will pro-
ceed without the client's cooperation, over the client's objection, and with 
the belief that the client is actually incompetent. It is hard to imagine how 
the defense attorney will investigate the case or what witnesses the attorney 
should question from the defense perspective. In the Edwards case, the de-
fense attorney rejected the client's requested defense and lost the case any-
way. 
Yet, it is impossible to ascertain from the Supreme Court ruling in 
Edwards whether the defendant rejected his attorney's advice because that 
advice was mediocre (as demonstrated by his conviction), or whether the 
defendant acted irrationally by rejecting brilliant advice (which then weak-
ened his defense). 118 The "difficult client" is not unique to criminal law. 
Psychiatry and psychological studies have observed this phenomenon. "If a 
patient is purposely difficult, does that mean that he or she is not ill? Should 
other standards be applied when the patient is not ill? Or is this particular 
behavior proof of a very serious disease that gravely affects the free will of 
the patient?"119 Essentially, because mental illness itself impacts the way an 
individual's brain functions, the mental illness likely interferes with the 
defendant's ability to make rational decisions. 
117. "But in many jurisdictions bench trials far outnumber jury trials, and in virtually 
all jurisdictions resolution by guilty pleas overwhelmingly outnumbers any sort of trial-
pleas being the resolution technique of choice in at least 90 percent of cases." Andrew E. 
Taslitz, The Guilty Plea State, 23 CRJM. JUST. 3, 3 (2008). 
118. Although he dissents, Justice Scalia seems convinced that the outcome would 
have been the same either way. 
The facts of this case illustrate this point with the utmost clarity. Edwards wished 
to take a self-defense case to the jury. His counsel preferred a defense that focused 
on lack of intent. Having been denied the right to conduct his own defense, Ed-
wards was convicted without having had the opportunity to present to the jury the 
grounds he believed supported his innocence. I do not doubt that he likely would 
have been convicted anyway. 
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 189 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
119. Bauke Koekkoek, Bemo van Miejel & Giel Hutschemaekers, "Difficult Pa-
tients" in Mental Health Care, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 795, 800 (2006), available at 
http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/data/Joumals/PSS/3770/06ps795.pdf. 
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Serious mental illnesses120 manifest themselves in symptoms that in-
clude hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder, disorganized behavior, 
magical thinking, and irrational behavior. 121 Thus, the criminal defendant 
who suffers from a serious mental illness often acts hostilely as a result of 
the illness interfering with brain function, not because he rationally rejects 
legal assistance. Additionally, while mentally ill individuals may also fail to 
cooperate with their psychiatrists, "the nuances of the attorney-defendant 
relationship differ from those of the therapeutic relationship and are not 
always apparent."122 The mentally ill criminal defendant whose symptoms 
include delusions or paranoia may honestly believe that the defense attorney 
is conspiring against him. "For instance, many defendants have the capacity 
to form a collaborative relationship with others, but nonetheless harbor sus-
picions regarding attorneys assigned by the state to represent them, perceiv-
ing these public defenders as colluding with the prosecution through their 
link as state employees."123 The Supreme Court seems unaware that by forc-
ing an attorney on a mentally ill individual whose delusions make him be-
lieve that the attorney is cooperating with the government fulfills rather than 
contradicts that delusion. 
The Supreme Court's complete lack of insight into interpersonal rela-
tionships might actually signify something more insidious: a lack of con-
cern. The Court has solved the problem of court disruption by mentally ill 
individuals who are Dusky competent by developing a meaningless term 
(gray-area), assigning defense counsel a phantom role, and by silencing the 
client's voice and ignoring the voices only the mentally ill defendant can 
hear. As Professor Christopher Slobogin notes: 
After Godinez and Edwards, the trial judge has enormous discretion in deciding 
whether a person with mental illness who is competent to stand trial may represent 
herself. These decisions also suggest, intentionally or not, how judges should exer-
cise this discretion, to wit, that the right to self-representation for people with men-
tal illness should depend primarily on whether the defendant wants to plead guilty 
or not guilty. If a mentally ill defendant who is nonetheless competent to stand trial 
wants to plead guilty without counsel, Godinez suggests, he should be allowed to 
do so, but if the defendant wants to go to trial on his own, Edwards advises, he 
should usually be forced to accept counsel. One would not be churlish in conclud-
120. The National Institute of Mental Health defines the four major mental illnesses 
as: schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, other severe forms of depression, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder. See Mental Disorders in America, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-
america/index.shtmi#Intro (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
121. See Symptom Checker, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/symp 
tom-checker/DS00671 (last visited Jan. 26, 20 13) (providing links to discussion of symp-
toms). 
122. Colwell & Gianesini, supra note 86, at 305. 
123. !d. 
1172 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1149 
ing that the overriding objective of Godinez and Edwards is to ensure that the state 
can proceed as efficiently as possible in dealing with mentally ill people. 124 
Thus the Edwards decision indicates that the Supreme Court values 
maintaining courtroom decorum and ensuring judicial efficiency more than 
upholding the Sixth Amendment rights of mentally ill criminal defendants. 
B. Padilla v. Kentucky 
Padilla v. Kentucky similarly offers an illusory solution to a compel-
ling problem, and once again unfairly burdens the criminal defense attorney 
while doing nothing to improve the criminal defendant's situation. 125 In con-
cluding that Padilla's trial counsel was ineffective for failure to inform Pa-
dilla of the deportation risk accompanying a guilty plea, the Supreme Court 
began its discussion by noting that Jose Padilla was a very sympathetic de-
fendant. Jose Padilla "has been a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States for more than 40 years. Padilla served this Nation with honor as a 
member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War."126 Despite his 
military and other personal accomplishments, Padilla apparently became a 
courier of illegal narcotics and was convicted of transporting a large quanti-
ty of marijuana in Kentucky, a crime to which he pled guilty. 127 
Padilla is significant because it created an additional duty under "ef-
fective assistance" when immigration issues are present. In Strickland v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
an effective defense attorney. 128 In order to demonstrate that defendant was 
harmed by the attorney's performance below the minimum standard of 
competency: 
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. 129 
Additionally, the Court held in McMann v. Richardson that criminal 
defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel before deciding 
whether or not to plead guilty .130 Effective assistance of counsel prior to 
accepting a guilty plea includes advice concerning consequences of a guilty 
plea, such as waiver of rights and impact on other sentences. In Padilla, the 
124. Slobogin, supra note 82, at 392. 
125. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1490-92 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
126. ld at 1477 (majority opinion). 
127. !d. 
128. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
129. !d. at 694. 
130. 397U.S. 759,771 (1970). 
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Court identified another aspect of effectiveness as requiring that "counsel 
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation."131 
The Court concluded Padilla's defense counsel "not only failed to ad-
vise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him 
that he 'did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in 
the country so long. "'132 Yet, Padilla did not allege that he was innocent of 
the charges against him. Nor did he claim that he would have been acquitted 
had he forced the government to prove the case against him. Instead, he 
merely asserted that "he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not 
received incorrect advice from his attorney."133 The problem the Court be-
lieves it is solving-saving a deserving Vietnam War veteran from deporta-
tion-is merely illusory. If Padilla had been convicted at trial, he neverthe-
less would have been subject to deportation.134 The only way Padilla could 
have avoided deportation would have been to not traffic in narcotics or to 
not get caught doing so. 
In placing the burden of warning criminal defendants when convic-
tions may result in deportation on the defense attorney, the Court announces 
that "deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal pro-
cess.'ms Yet, what the Court should have said is that deportation is intimate-
ly related to the criminal process--except in the majority of criminal cases, 
because the majority of criminal defendants are citizens of the United States 
and are therefore not subject to deportation. 136 The United States does not 
deport its own citizen when one is convicted of a crime. The risk of deporta-
tion only applies to individuals who are convicted of a crime and are citi-
zens of another country. 
Even accepting the Court's erroneous premise underlying the Padilla 
opinion, that criminal defense attorneys must be exposed to immigration 
issues in the vast majority of cases, the Court still confuses information 
known to the client with information the defense attorney should be able to 
provide. While '"alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea 
131. 
132. 
2008)). 
130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
/d. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 
133. !d. 
134. Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn't Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REv. 1393, 
1399 (2011) ("Immigration law's increasingly punitive severity in recent decades has left 
many fewer offenses that do not trigger mandatory deportation, and the facts of a routine 
case like Mr. Padilla's may provide no realistic options for avoiding immigration law's harsh 
mandates."). 
135. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1481. 
136. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN 
STATISTICS (March 2011). Seventy-five percent of federal prisoners are U.S. citizens. Peter 
H. Schuck, Op-Ed., Do Not Go Directly to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A33. "Non-
citizen criminals represent a significant percentage of American prisoners: in 2009, some 25 
percent of federal prisoners and a smaller fraction of state prisoners were non-citizens." /d. 
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agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their con-
victions,"'137 there is simply no reason to believe that criminal defense at-
torneys should be at all aware of such consequences, nor any reason to be-
lieve that criminal defense attorneys are even aware the client is an illegal 
alien. 
The United States is a country of immigrants from all over the world. 
Some immigrants, such as Padilla, choose to live in the United States for 
many years without applying for citizenship. 138 Some individuals who speak 
with accented English and have names unfamiliar to defense counsel have 
nonetheless been citizens for several decades. 139 Finally, there are individu-
als who have names that are not exotic or hard to spell, who speak faultless 
English with no foreign accent, who nonetheless are noncitizens, and who 
may in fact face deportation consequences if convicted. 14° Criminal defense 
attorneys are not uniquely qualified to discern a citizen from a noncitizen. 
Nor has inquiring into a criminal defendant's immigration status ever been 
considered an aspect of effective assistance of counsel for a criminal de-
fense attorney .141 
137. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82 (majority opinion) (quoting l.NS. v. St. Cyr., 533 
u.s. 289, 322 (2001)). 
138. See id. at 1477. Many noncitizens came to the United States as children and are 
sometimes unaware of their citizenship status. See, e.g., World War II Vet Finds Out He Is 
Not a U.S. Citizen, FoxNEWS.COM (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011 
/03/23/world-war-ii-vet-finds-citizen/ ("World War II veteran Leeland Davidson has been 
living in America for nearly 100 years, but he only just learned he is not in fact a U.S. citi-
zen. The 95-year-old's parents were born in the U.S., but they had him while in Canada. And 
the proper paperwork apparently was never filed to report Davidson as being born to Ameri-
cans living abroad .... [H]e had assumed that he already had been granted American citizen-
ship as a child and was surprised to find out otherwise."). 
139. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT U.S. 
NATRUALIZATIONS: 2010 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ 
publications/natz _ fr _ 20 I O.pdf. 
140. For example, in 1994, 188 citizens of Canada and 77 citizens of Great Britain 
were convicted of criminal offenses in U.S. District Courts. Noncitizens in the Federal Crim-
inal Justice System, ALASKA JUST. F., Winter 1997, at 2. The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
reports on noncitizens in U.S. federal courts and prisons. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ-160934, NONCITIZENS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1996). 
141. "The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel 
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation." Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (citing 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
REPRESENTATION 6.2 (1995); G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING§ 3.03 (1997); Ga-
briel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Conse-
quences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 713-718 (2002); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, 
LAW OF SENTENCING § 13:23 (3d ed. 2004); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR 
ATIORNEY PERFORMANCE H-J (2000); AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-5.l(a) (3d ed. 1993); ABA, 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, 14-3.2(t) (3d ed. 1999)). 
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Defense attorneys believe that the effective assistance of counsel 
standard was set forth in Strickland v. Washington; 42 despite the Court's 
current dicta to the contrary or their reliance upon various ineffective assis-
tance of counsel guidelines. 143 In fact, none of the resources cited by the 
Court have any authority or control over the standards of criminal de-
fense.144 They are merely advisory, and many suggestions or advice in each 
of those cited resources contain other suggestions that are equally non-
binding on the defense bar. 145 To define a constitutional rule by what 
amounts to best practices suggestions demeans the Constitution and dimin-
ishes the Supreme Court's role of expressing constitutional standards. 
Additionally, the Padilla decision seems unaware that the majority of 
criminal convictions occur in state courts, and state governments have abso-
lutely no power to deport illegal aliens. 146 Therefore, even if a state defend-
ant is concerned about the immigration consequences of accepting a plea 
bargain, there is nothing that the state government can do to alleviate those 
concerns. The state government does not enforce federal immigration laws . 
. -, Prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel on the state level typically do not 
discuss the immigration status of the defendant during the plea bargain pro-
cess, trial, or sentencing. 147 Since state government has no power to impact 
immigration consequences, there is nothing for the state prosecutor and the 
defense attorney to negotiate. Nor can a state judge order deportation as part 
of a sentence. 148 
The Court also ignores the reality of modern criminal defense. As dis-
cussed in Part I, the majority of criminal defendants are both indigent and 
are prosecuted in state court. 149 Thus, the majority of defense attorneys are 
142. 466 u.s. 668, 690-94 (1984). 
143. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). 
144. See id. 
145. !d. at 1482-83; id. at 1488 (Aiito, J., concurring). 
146. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). "Arizona may have 
understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that pro-
cess continues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law." !d. at 
2510. In Arizona: 
The [C]ourt threw out three such provisions in the Arizona law. It said the state 
cannot make it a misdemeanor for immigrants to not carry registration documents; 
criminalize the act of an illegal immigrant seeking employment; or authorize state 
officers to arrest someone on the belief that the person has committed an offense 
that makes him deportable. 
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Upholds Key Part of Arizona Law for Now, Strikes Down 
Other Provisions, WASH. POST (June 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
supreme-court-rules-on-arizona-immigration-law/20 12/06/25/gJQAONrm IV_ story .htrnl 
(analyzing Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona v. United States). 
147. Brown, supra note 134, at 1407. 
148. See 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006) (providing exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. district 
courts). 
149. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
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either court-appointed or public defenders. The funding, training, and su-
pervision of such attorneys does vary, but such attorneys tend to be the least 
experienced and lowest paid of all attorneys. 150 Yet, similar to the Edwards 
decision unfairly expecting defense attorneys to solve systemic problems 
within the criminal justice process, the Court requires that the lowest paid, 
least experienced, and least likely to have ever appeared in immigration 
court or even read a federal immigration statute must bear the responsibility 
of warning the criminal defendant of immigration consequences-
consequences that the Court acknowledges noncitizen defendants them-
selves are already acutely aware of, but that may be unknown to the attor-
ney. 
The Supreme Court requires that criminal defendants must be warned 
of clear immigration consequences, regardless of whether the defendant is 
convicted in state or federal court and regardless of whether or not an immi-
gration warrant has been served.151 The Court explained in Padilla: 
Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some mem-
bers of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or fed-
eral court or both, may not be well versed in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly 
be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea 
are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more 
limited. When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is in many of the 
scenarios posited by Justice Alito), a criminal defense attorney need do no more 
than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly 
clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. 152 
Such an expectation reveals a profound misunderstanding of the role 
of state defense counsel. Additionally, the Court overestimates access to 
resources for many practicing criminal defense attorneys as well as the dif-
ficulty in discovering which law to interpret when the defendant is not cur-
rently charged with a violation of that law. 153 
For example, the Court claims that "Padilla's counsel could have easi-
ly determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply 
from reading the text of the statute."154 The Court's decision ignores the fact 
that Padilla was not charged under the immigration statute at the time of 
defense counsel's representation. Additionally, the Court misleadingly re-
fers to the "statute" without revealing that they are referring to a statute that 
Padilla had not yet been charged with violating.155 
150. See generally WICE, supra note 15. 
151. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
152. !d. 
153. !d. 
154. !d. 
155. !d. 
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Trial counsel is likely surprised and confused as to what statute the 
Court is referring. Surely defense counsel read the statues under which Pa-
dilla was charged with the following crimes: possession of marijuana/ 56 
possession of drug paraphernalia, 157 and trafficking in marijuana, greater 
156. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.l422 (West 2002) ("Possession of marijuana; 
penalty-maximum term of incarceration. (1) A person is guilty of possession of marijuana 
when he or she knowingly and unlawfully possesses marijuana. (2) Possession of marijuana 
is a Class B misdemeanor, except that, KRS Chapter 532 to the contrary notwithstanding, the 
maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than forty-five (45) days."). 
157. /d. §218A.500: 
Definitions for KRS 218A.500 and 218A.510-Unlawful practices-Penalties. As used in 
this section and KRS 218A.51 0: 
(1) 'Drug paraphernalia' means all equipment, products and materials of any kind 
which are used, intended for use or designed for use in planting, propagating, culti-
vating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, 
processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, contain-
ing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the 
human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. It includes but is 
not limited to: (a) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, prop-
agating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting of any species of plant which is a con-
trolled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived; (b) Kits 
used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, con-
verting, producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances; (c) Isomeriza-
tion devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in increasing the potency of 
any species of plant which is a controlled substance; (d) Testing equipment used, 
intended for use, or designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the strength, ef-
fectiveness or purity of controlled substances; (e) Scales and balances used, intend-
ed for use, or designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled substances; (f) 
Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dex-
trose and lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting controlled 
substances; (g) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed for 
use in removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining mariju-
ana; (h) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing devices used, intended for 
use, or designed for use in compounding controlled substances; (i) Capsules, bal-
loons, envelopes, and other containers used, intended for use, or designed for use 
in packaging small quantities of controlled substances; (j) Containers and other ob-
jects used, intended for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled 
substances; (k) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, intended for 
use, or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into the hu-
man body; and (I) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, 
inhaling, or otherwise introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into 
the human body, such as: metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic 
pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured met-
al bowls; water pipes; carburetion tubes and devices; smoking and carburetion 
masks; roach clips which mean objects used to hold burning material, such as mari-
juana cigarettes, that have become too small or too short to be held in the hand; 
miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials; chamber pipes; carburetor pipes; elec-
tric pipes; air-driven pipes; chillums; bongs; ice pipes or chillers. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug para-
phernalia for the purpose of planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, 
manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, test-
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than five pounds. 158 Yet those statutes did not list deportation as a possible 
punishment because the Commonwealth of Kentucky does not have any 
authority, power, or mechanism to deport anyone. 159 Padilla was convicted 
in state court for violating state statutes. The Court's requirement that a de-
fense attorney simply "read[] the text of the statute" and discover the obvi-
ous deportation punishment is confusing and misleading. 160 
The statute that Padilla's defense attorney was ineffective for not read-
ing was not any of the statutes under which Padilla was actually charged. 161 
Nor was it a statute that would ever be mentioned by either the prosecutor 
or the judge in Padilla's case. Nor would it likely be referenced during a 
guilty plea or a jury trial on his pending charges, nor litigated anywhere 
/d. 
/d. 
ing, analyzing, packing, repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, in-
gesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this chapter. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manu-
facture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances 
where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, culti-
vate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, 
test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or other-
wise introduce into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this 
chapter. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or 
other publication any advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where one 
reasonably should know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, 
is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia. 
(5) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 
A misdemeanor. 
158. /d.§ 218A.I421: 
Trafficking in marijuana-Penalties: 
(I) A person is guilty of trafficking in marijuana when he knowingly and unlawful-
ly traffics in marijuana. 
(2) Trafficking in less than eight (8) ounces of marijuana is: (a) For a first offense a 
Class A misdemeanor. (b) For a second or subsequent offense a Class D felony. 
(3) Trafficking in eight (8) or more ounces but less than five (5) pounds of mariju-
ana is: (a) For a first offense a Class D felony. (b) For a second or subsequent of-
fense a Class C felony. 
(4) Trafficking in five (5) or more pounds of marijuana is: (a) For a first offense a 
Class C felony. (b) For a second or subsequent offense a Class B felony. 
(5) The unlawful possession by any person of eight (8) or more ounces of marijua-
na shall be prima facie evidence that the person possessed the marijuana with the 
intent to sell or transfer it. 
159. The relevant available penalties are: (I) a maximum of forty-five days for pos-
session of marijuana; (2) a maximum of a Class A misdemeanor for paraphernalia; and (3) a 
Class C felony for a first offense trafficking in marijuana. /d. §§ 218A.I422, 218A.500, § 
218A.I421; see supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
160. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
161. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
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within the courthouse where Padilla was prosecuted. 162 Instead, the statute 
that Padilla's attorney was ineffective for not reading was a federal immi-
gration statute!63 
The Court referenced the statute as if Padilla had been charged with its 
violation instead of the state level narcotics violations. Then, the Court criti-
cized defense counsel for not referencing and accurately analyzing the stat-
ute even though the attorney had not been retained or appointed to defend 
Padilla on an immigration violation. 
Indeed, the Court in Padilla misleadingly referred to the defense at-
torney's failure to read the statute but did not acknowledge that the statutes 
under which Padilla was convicted did not reference the federal immigra-
tion statute. 164 The statute that defense counsel apparently should have read 
"addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically com-
mands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most 
trivial of marijuana possession offenses."165 Although that may be true, it is 
also true that since the defendant did not have a pending immigration case at 
that time, defense counsel would not have known which statute applied. 166 
At the time of defense counsel's representation, Padilla was charged 
with state offenses and had a detainer lodged against him by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (IRS), stating that "investigation has been 
162. There are two court orders outlining what information was discussed at convic-
tion and sentencing. Kentucky v. Padilla, No. 01-CR-00517, 2002 WL 34506930 (Ky. Cir. 
Ct., Sept. 4, 2002) ("Defendant was interrogated by the Court, and the Court finds that the 
Defendant understands the charges against him, that the Defendant knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waives his right to a trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
right of confrontation of witnesses, and that there is a factual basis for the Defendant's 
plea."); Kentucky v. Padilla, No. 01-CR-00517, 2002 WL 34507077 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Oct. 4, 
2002) ("The Court inquired of the Defendant and his attorney whether they had any legal 
cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced, and afforded the Defendant and his 
attorney the opportunity to make statements in the Defendant's behalf and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment, and the Court having informed the Defendant of the 
factual contents and conclusions contained in the written report of the pre-sentence investiga-
tion prepared by the Divisions of Probation and Parole and provided Defendants' attorney 
with a copy of the report although not the sources of confidential information, the Defendant 
agreed with the factual contents of the report."). 
163. "In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, 
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction." Padilla, 
130 S. Ct. at 1483 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) ("Any alien who at any time 
after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) 
any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance ... , other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 
grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.")). It is worth noting that despite the Court's claim 
that this statute is "succinct, clear, and explicit," it is likely also subject to interpretation and 
debate. !d. 
164. 
165. 
166. 
See supra text accompanying notes 143-47. 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
Defense counsel would merely be guessing, and may guess incorrectly. 
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initiated to determine whether this person is subject to removal from the 
United States."167 While defense counsel likely knew of that detainer since it 
impacted Padilla's bond, the detainer did not refer to the "statute" that the 
Supreme Court believed defense counsel should have read. 168 
Significantly, almost two years passed between Padilla's fmal judg-
ment on the Kentucky charges and his motion for post-conviction relief 
concerning the deportation. 169 This likely indicates that there was no immi-
gration charge for some time after conviction in the state court. Thus, Pa-
dilla's defense counsel would not only be unaware of what federal charges 
might be brought against the defendant at the time of trial, he also would 
have been unaware for some time after Padilla's conviction for the narcotics 
offenses. 
Most startlingly, the Court does not even require that a post-Padilla at-
torney inquire whether or not a client is an immigrant. Instead, the Court 
announced a general requirement, as if every criminal defendant risks pos-
sible deportation. "It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure 
that no criminal defendant-whether a citizen or not-is left to the 'mercies 
of incompetent counsel.' To satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that 
counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deporta-
tion."170 This does not indicate that the defense attorney must inquire into a 
client's citizenship status. Rather, the holding requires that defense counsel 
must always inform the client of immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea-whether or not any are possible. Certainly, even a defense attorney 
with limitless resources and time would find it ludicrous to inform a client 
of deportation risks of a guilty plea when such information is irrelevant. Yet 
the broad language of Padilla indicates that such an attorney is required to 
do so. 171 
167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009) (No. 08-651 ). 
168. /d. 
169. "Final judgment was entered October 4, 2002. On August 18, 2004, Padilla filed 
an RCr 11.42 motion for post-conviction relief alleging that his attorney was ineffective in 
misadvising him about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea." 
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482,483 (Ky. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
170. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
(1970)). 
171. Many commenters on the Padilla decision are embracing this image of the de-
fense attorney as the one who solves all of the problems. See Mathew Millen & Phoebe P. 
Liu, Supreme Court Sends a Message to Criminal Defense Attorneys Whose Clients Are Not 
Citizens: Do Not Ignore the Defendant's Immigration Status, FED. LAW., July 2010, at 20, 22 
("As a practical matter, defense counsel should (I) be sufficiently familiar with immigration 
law to be able to render correct advice on the immigration consequences of various criminal 
charges; (2) consult with an immigration attorney when provided with a plea offer from 
which immigration consequences are, or may be, unclear; or (3) advise the client that a plea 
may have immigration consequences and refer the client to an immigration attorney for di-
rect consultation about the immigration consequences of the plea. A criminal defense attor-
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Instead of using such broad, all-encompassing language for a narrow 
problem, and instead of assigning defense counsel to resolve all inequities 
in the criminal justice system, the Court could have ruled on the narrow 
case presented by Padilla. Had the Court simply found that Padilla's de-
fense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel on the facts of the 
case, the Court's ruling would have accurately reflected the procedural his-
tory of the case and fairly addressed Padilla's specific situation. Padilla's 
defense attorney gave him incorrect advice: 
Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence 
prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he "did not have to worry about 
immigration status since he had been in the country so long." Padilla relied on his 
counsel's erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made 
his deportation virtually mandatory. 172 
Requiring that defense counsel simply refrain from giving incorrect advice 
would have resolved Padilla's complaint and given clear guidance to the 
defense bar. 
Such a resolution found support among the Supreme Court Justices. In 
his concurrence, Justice Alito suggested an alternative standard that does 
not require defense attorneys to master immigration law: 
I concur in the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to provide effec-
tive assistance within the meaning of Strickland ... , if the attorney misleads a 
noncitizen client regarding the removal consequences of a conviction. In my view, 
such an attorney must (1) refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and 
(2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration 
consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should con-
sult an immigration attorney. I do not agree with the Court that the attorney must 
attempt to explain what those consequences may be.173 
Additionally, Justice Scalia acknowledged in his dissent that "[i]n the 
best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea 
ought to be advised of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and 
surely ought not to be misadvised."174 Here is one aspect of Padilla that 
none of the Justices dispute: defense counsel should refrain from giving 
incorrect advice. Such a standard should have been the one adopted by the 
Padilla Court. This would also avoid the concern expressed by the dissent 
in the Kentucky Supreme Court that "[ c ]ounsel who gives erroneous advice 
ney can protect against a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by providing the nonciti-
zen client with a thorough, well-researched legal opinion of the immigration consequences of 
the proposed plea."). See generally Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The "Major Upheav-
al" a/Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CR!M. JUST., Summer 2010, at 36. 
172. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (citation omitted). 
173. /d. at 1487 (Aiito, J., concurring). 
174. /d. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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to a client which influences a felony conviction is worse than no lawyer at 
all."11s 
The Padilla Court believes that it has rectified an injustice. The Court 
seems confident that defense attorneys will be able to notify defendants of 
possible collateral consequences of a guilty plea, including immigration 
consequences. However, the Court fails to recognize that there is not much 
the defense counsel can do to otherwise impact that consequence or to im-
prove the defendant's situation. As Professor Darryl K. Brown notes, there 
was not anything that the defense attorney or even the prosecutor in the Pa-
dilla case itself could have done to alter the reality that Padilla was likely to 
be convicted of something, and that conviction would almost certainly result 
in deportation: 
Even if Mr. Padilla's attorney and the Hardin County prosecutor had been bargain-
ing with an awareness of the deportation provisions of federal immigration Jaw-
and even if the prosecutor had been inclined to agree to a disposition that reduced 
Mr. Padilla's odds for deportation-no options for doing so existed, because no op-
tion would prevent deportation except politically impossible ones-nonprosecution 
or charging only with misdemeanor possession. 176 
There was no possibility of avoiding deportation because of the facts 
of the case: Padilla was stopped at a weigh station in Kentucky, consented 
to a search of his truck, and was discovered to be transporting 1,000 pounds 
(about 453 kilograms) ofmarijuana. 177 
Not only are the deportation consequences of a guilty plea likely be-
yond the power of the defense attorney's control, they are likely often be-
yond the prosecutor's ability to control. The majority of street crimes are 
prosecuted on the state level by state prosecutors. 178 State level prosecutors 
have virtually no power to impact immigration consequences, since immi-
gration law is federal law, prosecuted and decided by federal immigration 
attorneys and judges.179 
Nor do state prosecutors have any incentive to extend a plea offer to a 
noncitizen that will remove deportation risks. 180 In fact, prosecutors typical-
ly have exactly the opposite motivation: the consequence of deportation 
adds to the incentive to have the defendant convicted of a deportable 
crime. 181 Some scholars have optimistically predicted that Padilla will im-
prove the plea bargaining process. Padilla "gives defenders new tools with 
175. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485 (Cunningham, J., dissenting). 
176. Brown, supra note 134, at 140 I. 
177. /d. at 1400. 
178. Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding 
the Alarm or "Crying Wolf'?, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1317, 1333-1335 (2000). 
179. Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 263-65 (20 11 ). 
180. Brown, supra note 134, at 1404-05. 
181. /d. at 1406-07. 
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which to advocate for their clients, and introduces greater transparency and 
fairness into the plea process."182 Such a view rests on the mistaken premise 
that prosecutors breathlessly wait for good reasons to sweeten a plea offer, 
rather than the reality: prosecutors offer the minimum reduction in charges 
or sentences that they believe a defendant will accept. 183 Prosecutors are 
motivated to some degree by expediency, but rarely are they more influ-
enced by what would be in the best interest of the defendant. 184 
III. SOLUTIONS 
Instead of requiring that defense attorneys resolve all inequities in the 
criminal justice system-duties that do nothing to assist in defending the 
pending criminal charge-the Supreme Court should have addressed the 
underlying problems. The problem underlying the Edwards case is an obvi-
ous one: instead of pretending that a psychotic, delusional, or hallucinating 
mentally ill individual is somehow incapable of self-representation, the 
Court should recognize that such an individual is likely incompetent desp.it;e 
...... 
the application of the Dusky competency standard. The problem underlying 
the Padilla case is that committing crimes as a noncitizen results in almost 
automatic deportation, and nothing the state defense attorney can do will 
alter that result. If an individual is entitled to immigration defense, then 
appoint him an immigration defense attorney. If the defendant should be 
aware of this consequence, then notify him of that at arraignment or guilty 
plea. 
A. Solving the Edwards Situation 
Underlying the Court's Edwards decision that a "gray-area" defendant 
is incompetent for self-representation even though the defendant is compe-
tent to stand trial is the failure of the Dusky competency standard. Profound-
ly mentally ill individuals, including those who are currently psychotic, are 
found competent to stand trial. 185 The Dusky competency to stand trial 
standard is simply inadequate. When competency is an issue, the trial court 
must determine "(1) 'whether' the defendant has 'a rational as well as factu-
al understanding of the proceedings against him' and (2) whether the de-
fendant 'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a rea-
182. Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to 
Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CHAMPION, May 20 I 0, at 18, 24. 
183. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463,2471-72 (2004). 
184. Brown, supra note 134, at 1406. 
185. See Davoli, supra note 48, at 317. 
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sonable degree of rational understanding. "'186 The flaw in the Dusky stand-
ard is that an individual may meet the standard while he nevertheless is hal-
lucinating, delusional, or psychotic. 187 
The Supreme Court could easily improve the competency to stand trial 
standard by adding a third component that specifically addresses the Ed-
wards-type defendant: "Whether the defendant suffers from a serious men-
tal illness and is currently psychotic, delusional, or hallucinating."188 This 
third component addresses the majority, if not all, of the "gray-area" de-
fendants described by the Edwards Court. Such a defendant is found com-
petent under Dusky, but his mental illness prevents him from representing 
himself, almost always precisely because he is psychotic, delusional, or 
hallucinating. The Court could require that restoration to competency in-
clude treatment to reduce the symptoms of mental illness and clear the de-
fendant's mind so that he can function rationally. 
Currently, restoration to competency does not require that the symp-
toms of mental illness be under treatment. 189 While "the prototypical incom-
petent defendant may be described as someone with a history of psychiatric 
symptoms, particularly severe psychosis, poor functional abilities and 
community resources, and poor psycholegal abilities,"190 restoration to com-
petency does not require that such symptoms be eradicated. Rather, restora-
tion only requires that the minimum Dusky standard be met. 191 Adding the 
proposed third component ensuring that the defendant is not psychotic, de-
lusional, or hallucinating would obviate the need to force a defense attorney 
on an objecting, Dusky-competent defendant. 
B. Solving the Padilla Situation 
An alternative to requiring that defense attorneys give a "Padilla-
warning" might require judges to bear the burden on the immigration status 
issue. Judges currently ensure that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waives his constitutional right to a jury trial prior to pleading guilty. Like-
wise, presiding trial judges also inquire whether or not a defendant wishes 
to waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and testify during a 
186. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)) (emphasis omitted). 
187. See supra Subsection II.A.5. 
188. See Davoli, supra note 48, at 317. 
189. See Douglas Mossman et at., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychi-
atric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S44 
(Supp. 2007) (citing studies showing that significant percentages of defendants with schizo-
phrenia, other psychotic illnesses, affective disorders, or mental retardation are found compe-
tent to stand trial). 
190. See Colwell & Gianesini, supra note 86, at 298. 
191. Mossman et at., supra note 189, at S44. 
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criminal trial. 192 Obviously, defense attorneys must advise clients of such 
rights before the guilty plea or trial; yet, judges still determine whether or 
not such decisions are made freely and voluntarily.193 
An additional advantage to requiring that the judge warn the defendant 
of immigration consequences during the plea colloquy would be that a clear, 
unequivocal record of that warning is created. Thus, there would be no abil-
ity to appeal the issue on an ineffectiveness assistance of counsel claim if 
the responsibility lay with the trial court judge instead of the defense attor-
ney. In Padilla, the substance of the attorney's advice was not litigated on 
the Supreme Court level. 194 However, throughout the state proceedings, the 
substance of the attorney's advice was in dispute. 195 Placing the burden of 
the duty to warn on the defense attorney undoubtedly creates an additional 
appellate claim that will necessitate an evidentiary hearing for resolution. In 
contrast, a simple review of the record would suffice if the responsibility lay 
with the trial court judge. 
Furthermore, requiring the judge to warn the defendant at the time of a 
guilty plea means that if a defendant opts to request a trial instead of a guilty 
plea, the witnesses remain readily available. As in Padilla's case, such 
claims might arise years after the original trial date. If the appellate court 
reverses a guilty plea and remands the case for a new trial, the prosecution 
will have a much more difficult time reconstructing the evidence and locat-
ing the witnesses after the passage of many years. 
Another possibility for ensuring that a defendant is warned of potential 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea would be to place the burden on 
the prosecutor. Even a state prosecutor would have better opportunities and 
contacts with federal authorities than an indigent client's defense attorney. 
The prosecutor could obtain definitive information about which federal stat-
ute applied and what impact it would have in a particular case. Additionally, 
the prosecutor would have a vested interest in ensuring that a plea offer is 
not reversible on appeal. Since the prosecution makes the plea offer, the 
prosecutor should be the one to investigate the immigration impact as part 
ofthe resolution of the case. 
Finally, the Supreme Court could have required that states establish 
procedural or administrative procedures to ensure that a defendant was 
aware of the specific immigration consequences of a guilty plea. In his dis-
sent, Justice Scalia outlines a variety of options that could have solved Pa-
dilla's problem without burdening defense counsel: 
192. /d.atS7. 
193. /d.atS11. 
194. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
195. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 
1473 (2010). 
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The Court's holding prevents legislation that could solve the problems addressed 
by today's opinions in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not 
been constitutionalized, legislation could specify which categories of misadvice 
about matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collat-
eral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant's attention, and what warn-
ings must be given. Moreover, legislation could provide consequences for the mis-
advice, nonadvice, or failure to warn, other than nullification of a criminal convic-
tion after the witnesses and evidence needed for retrial have disappeared. Federal 
immigration law might provide, for example, that the near-automatic removal 
which follows from certain criminal convictions will not apply where the convic-
tion rested upon a guilty plea induced by counsel's misadvice regarding removal 
consequences. Or legislation might put the government to a choice in such circum-
stances: Either retry the defendant or forgo the removal. But all that has been pre-
cluded in favor oftoday's sledge hammer.196 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito also suggested alternatives to ensure 
a defendant is warned of immigration consequences without additionally 
burdening defense counsel. 197 Justice Alito joined in the judgment of Padilla 
precisely because Padilla's defense attorney specifically told him that there 
would be no deportation. While not acknowledging a duty to warn, Justice 
Alito agreed that giving misadvice does constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strick/and. 198 Justice Alito's concurrence should have been 
the Court's ruling: affirmative misadvice constitutes ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Such a ruling would have resulted in a reversal of Padilla's con-
viction while also directing criminal defense attorneys to refrain from giv-
ing immigration advice. 
Of course, proper funding could somewhat ameliorate the negative 
impact of these decisions. Because the Supreme Court requires that defense 
attorneys accept these new responsibilities, the Court has necessarily ex-
panded the rulings in both Gideon and Ake v. Oklahoma. 199 Read together, 
Gideon and Padilla indicate that the right to counsel now necessarily in-
cludes the right to an immigration attorney as well as a criminal defense 
attorney. Under Ake, the criminal defendant has a right to a psychiatric ex-
pert whenever mental health becomes an issue.200 It necessarily follows from 
this that the Edwards-competent defendant should be given a right to a de-
fense expert to help the defense attorney communicate effectively with the 
defendant, even in situations in which mental health will never be addressed 
during a guilty plea or a trial.201 Expanding the responsibilities of defense 
196. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
197. /d. at 1487 (Aiito, J., concurring). 
198. /d. 
199. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (allowing funds for a defense psy-
chiatric expert once the defendant demonstrates that his mental health will be an issue at 
trial). 
200. 470 U.S. at 83. 
20 I. "We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic 
account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who 
Attorneys for the Indigent: Psychiatry & Immigration Law 1187 
attorneys mandates that additional funding be made available to ensure that 
the defense attorneys can fulfill these duties. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees more than simply 
an attorney standing next to the defendant during the trial or guilty plea. As 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held, the language in the 
Sixth Amendment that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence"202 
ensures that the criminal defendant is represented by competent, zealous 
defense counsel. The presence of a defense attorney contributes to the fair-
ness of the trial and the integrity of the verdict: 
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, 
however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amend-
ment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions coun-
sel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce 
just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or 
appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.Z03 
Defense counsel's role is not to become a mere cog in a conviction 
machine. Instead, defense counsel stands between the client and injustice, 
protecting the client's liberty against governmental power. 
Yet the Padilla and Edwards decisions do nothing to ensure that guar-
antee of justice. Instead, the Court acknowledges systemic problems in the 
current criminal justice system and then assigns defense counsel as the solu-
tion. "In particular, these decisions impact the indigent client defenders who 
are among the least experienced and the most burdened by the current sys-
tem. The Supreme Court's recent decisions further burden defense counsel 
while doing absolutely nothing to improve representation or ensure trial 
fairness. The Supreme Court should refrain from attempting to solve every 
systemic problem in criminal justice by assigning defense counsel as the 
solution. 
seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so." Indiana v. Ed-
wards, 554 U.S. 164, 176-78 (2008). By requiring the trial judge to inquire into a defendant's 
mental capacities, the defendant's mental state now becomes an issue during trial which 
would trigger the requirement of the state to provide a mental health expert to the defendant. 
202. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
203. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 

